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The  paper  proposes  a way  to measure mechanical  and  psychological  effects  of majority 
runoff  versus  plurality  electoral  systems  in  candidate  elections.  Building  on  a  series  of 











Most of the  literature about electoral systems  is based on Maurice Duverger’s  intuitions.ii 
Duverger  claims  that  electoral  systems  have  systematic  effects  (hence  the  well‐known 
“laws”) on  the structure of electoral competition.  In particular,  the plurality rule entails a 




The  mechanical  effect,  which  takes  place  after  the  vote,  is  the  process  by  which  a 
distribution  of  votes  is  transformed  into  a  distribution  of  seats.  This  effect  is  purely 
mechanical because  it results from the strict application of the provisions of the electoral 
law.  The  psychological  effect,  which  takes  place  before  the  vote,  stems  from  the 
anticipation by voters and political actors of  the mechanical effect. Because actors know 
the distortion entailed by the transformation of votes into seats, they adapt their behaviour 






be elected. So,  rather  than  focusing of  the number of seats won by  the different parties, 
our  analysis  will  focus  on  the  types  of  candidate  which  are  elected.    In  particular,  we 






To  assess  these  effects,  we  build  on  a  series  of  laboratory  experiments  on  candidate 







electoral  records.  We  propose  to  complement  these  studies  by  resorting  to  laboratory 
experiments.  Indeed, voter preferences,  together with  the voting rule, are precisely what 
can be controlled  in the  laboratory. Other authors have used experiments to study voting 






majority  runoff  rules,  where  the  distribution  of  voter  preferences  over  a  fixed  set  of 
candidates  is  given  and  fixed.  We  compare  the  probability  that  a  Condorcet  winner  is 
elected  in  runoff  vs.  plurality  elections.  The  total  effect  of  the  runoff  system  versus  the 
plurality  system  is  the difference  in  the CW election probability when  voters  vote under 
runoff, compared to when they vote under plurality. We then propose to decompose this 










system).  Indeed,  in  the  runoff  system,  the  Condorcet winner  is  elected whenever  he  is 
ranked first or second on the first round (because the CW wins by definition in the pair‐wise 





the  mechanical  effect  of  the  electoral  system,  one  might  at  first  sight  expect  that  the 







21 subjects  (63 subjects  in six sessions) are  recruited  in Paris, Lille  (France) and Montreal 








positions  remain  the  same  through  the  whole  session.  Subjects  are  assigned  randomly 
drawn positions on the same 0 to 20 axis. They draw a first position before the first series of 
four elections, which they keep for the whole series.  After the first series of four elections, 
the  group moves  to  the  second  series of  four  elections, held  under  a  different  rule,  for 
which  participants  are  assigned  new  positions  (which  again  will  be  kept  for  the  whole 
series).  For each series, there are a total of 21 positions (from 0 to 20) and each of the 21 
participants  has  a  different  position  (draw without  replacement;  for  large  groups  of  63 
voters, three subjects are located in each position). The participants are informed about the 
distribution  of positions:  they  know  that  each possible position  is  filled  exactly once  (or 
thrice  in  sessions with 63  subjects) but  they do not  know by whom. Besides,  they  know 
their  own  position.  Voting  is  anonymous.    The  results  of  each  election  (scores  of  all 
candidates and identity of the elected candidate) are announced after each election. 
 




a  voter  whose  assigned  position  is  11  will  receive  10  Euros  if  candidate  A  wins  in  the 
decisive elections, 12 if E wins, 15 if B wins, 17 if D wins, and 19 if C wins. We thus generate 
single‐peaked preference profiles on the 5 candidates set. We will refer to candidates A and 
















The  total  effect  can  be  visualized  on Graph  1, which  displays,  for  each  voting  rule,  the 
percentage of elections where  the Condorcet winner  is  ranked  first,  second and  third or 
below (for runoff elections, this refers to first rounds). On the  left hand side of this graph, 









of  votes  into  seats.  In our  candidate  elections,  this  translates  into  the  transformation of 








What  is  the expected  sign of  this mechanical effect? As noted  in  the  introduction, under 
plurality the CW is elected if he is ranked first according to the obtained scores. Under the 














is  ranked  first  49%  of  the  time,  and  second  22%  of  the  times.  The  mechanical  effect 















voters  vote  under  the  two  rules. What  is  observed  in  the  data? We  know  that  the  CW 






We  see  that  the  mechanical  and  psychological  effects  partially  cancel  each  other  out, 







As noticed earlier,  the sign of  the psychological effect  is a priori ambiguous. We build on 
previous  individual‐level  analyses  of  these  experiments  by  Van  der  Straeten  et  al.  to 
propose  an  explanation  for  this  observed  negative  psychological  effect.  xix      In  our 
experimental  setting,  subjects are asked  to vote  in  series of  four elections, during which 
9 
 
everything  is  kept  constant except  that  voters  are,  at each date,  informed of  the  scores 
obtained by all candidates. By observing sequences of elections, we can see, in the lab, how 
each voter changes her votes and adapts to a voting rule. Van der Straeten et al. 2010 have 
shown  that  voters’  adaptation  through  time  amounts  to  voters  coordinating  on  two 
candidates in plurality elections and on three candidates in runoff elections.xx More exactly, 






are  observed  to  receive  few  votes,  so  that  they  do  not  belong  to  this  subset  of  viable 
candidates,  which  is  composed  of  candidates  B,  C  and  D.  As  a  consequence,  their 
supporters  gradually  desert  them  in  favour  of  the  two moderate  candidates  (but  not  in 
favour of C). Thereby, the CW candidate remains among the viable candidates, but is more 




On  the  contrary,  in plurality  elections,  there  are only  two  viable  candidates. At  the  first 
date, one pair of candidates emerges as being viable, and the votes after that focus on this 
pair.  Which  candidates  initially  emerge  appears  to  be  largely  due  to  chance,  among 
candidates B, C, and D. xxii Therefore, if candidate C initially belongs to the emerging pair, he 










to be viable. But because  there are  three viable candidates, supporters of  the non viable 
extreme  candidates are more  likely  to move  to  the moderate  candidate  that  is  closer  to 
their own position, thus weakening the CW candidate’s chances of making it to the second 





















Our  study  confirms  the usefulness of Duverger’s  famous distinction between mechanical 
and  psychological  effects.  We  have  seen  that  the  total  effect  of  runoff  (compared  to 
plurality)  is weak  only  because  the mechanical  and  psychological  effects  tend  to  cancel 
each other. It is true that the mechanical effect of runoffs is to systematically advantage CW 





disadvantaged by  the  electoral  system.  This  study has uncovered  an  instance where  the 
two effects contradict each other. This  is a reminder that we should not take  for granted 




ascertaining the  impact of electoral systems. This approach  is particularly useful  in sorting 














                       
 
   





                                                 
ii  Maurice Duverger, Les partis politiques (Paris : Armand Colin, 1951). 
iii Gary W. Cox, Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems 
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Study of Voting Rules and Polls in Three-Way Elections’ ). 
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286. 
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number of votes is elected (ties are broken randomly). Under the majority runoff system, on a first 
round, each voter votes for one candidate. If a candidate gets an absolute majority, he is elected. If  
not, one proceeds to a second round between the two candidates having obtained the highest two 
numbers of votes in the first round (ties are broken randomly). On the second round, each voter votes 
for one candidate; the candidate getting the highest number of votes is elected (ties again are broken 
randomly).   
xii  Participants are also paid a fixed sum of 5 Euros for showing up at the experiment. 
xiii Note that if subjects were to vote sincerely in plurality elections (or in the first round of a runoff 
election), the distribution of votes among candidates would be almost uniform. In expectation (with 
ties broken randomly), the extreme candidates A and E would each receive 4 votes, each of the 
moderate candidates B and D would get 4.5 votes, and the Condorcet winner C the remaining 4 votes. 
xiv All the results that are reported in this paper collapse the experiments held in Canada and France. 
The patterns are very similar in the two countries. They also merge sessions where the first series of 
elections is held under plurality and the second series under run-off systems (11 sessions), and those 
where the reverse order is used (12 sessions). The results turn out to be the same whether a given rule 
is utilized first or second. 
xv  During the experiment, ties were broken randomly. In the analysis, for reasons of consistency (see 
below), in case of such a tie, we reason in terms of probabilities. Consider for example the following 
scores: A:0, B:7, C:7, D:6, E:1 in a plurality election. There is a tie between candidates B and C. We 
then compute that with probability ½, candidate B (or C) is elected.  
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xvi  As in plurality elections, we take care of actual ties by reasoning in terms of probability (cf. 
footnote XV).  Besides, to compute the effects of runoff, we assume that the CW candidate is elected 
whenever he is present in the runoff. This is indeed the case in more than 95% of the elections in our 
experiments. Consider for example the following scores: A:0, B:8, C:6, D:6, E:1 in the first round of a 
runoff election. There is a tie between candidates C and D to decide which candidate will go to the 
runoff. We then compute that with probability ½ the runoff is between B and C, in which case C is 
elected with probability 1, and with probability ½, the run-off is between B and D, in which case C is 
not elected. With such a distribution of votes, we say that C is therefore elected with probability ½. 
We do this to have a consistent method when we perform counterfactual simulations. 
xvii Preliminary tests have shown that outcomes under plurality and outcomes under the runoff rule 
within the same session are not correlated. If one is to assume that observations within series of 
elections are also independent, the appropriate test is a proportion test on two independent samples, 
where C is elected in 45 cases out of 92 in plurality elections, and in 53 cases out of 92 in runoff 
elections. The test statistics is 1.18, with a two-tailed p-value of 0.24. The difference is not significant. 
Now, because of some learning and coordination effects going on within series of elections (see 
section 3.), observations within series are likely to be correlated. In that case, we rather take as the 
observational unit the average probability for the C candidate to be elected within a series of elections. 
The two-tailed Student’s t-test p-value is 0.46: again we cannot reject the hypothesis that the means 
are the same in the two samples. 
xviii  We perform similar tests as for the total effect (see footnote XVII), treating the two samples of 
plurality and runoff elections as independent. If we consider all elections as independent, C is elected 
in 53 cases out of 92 in runoff elections, and he would be elected 67 times out of 92 is we applied the 
run-off system on actual plurality votes.  The test statistics for a proportion test is -2.17, with a one-
tailed p-value of 0.015. Now, rather taking as the observational unit the average probability for the C 
candidate to be elected within a series of elections, we also perform a Student test. The one-sided 
Student’s t-test p-value is 0.11: we accept at 11% the hypothesis that the psychological effect is 
negative. 
xix See Karine Van der Straeten, Jean-François Laslier, Nicolas Sauger and André Blais, ‘Strategic, 
Sincere and Heuristic Voting under Four Election Rules: An Experimental Study’, Social Choice and 
Welfare, 35 (2010), 435–472. 
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xx We computed the average effective number of candidates at each date, for each voting rule. For 
plurality elections, this number drops from 4.08 at the first election, to 3.3 at the second, 2.88 at the 
third, and 2.53 at the last. For runoff elections, the average effective number of candidates is 4.28 at 
the first election, 3.54 at the second, 3.33 at the third, and 3.2 at the last. 
xxi This behaviour is consistent with voters voting according to Cox’s M + 1 rule, where M is the 
magnitude of the district. Indeed, even if only one candidate is finally elected in our candidate 
elections, the magnitude of the run-off system can be seen as equal to two, if viability is determined 
by the access to the run-off. Note that under plurality voting for one’s preferred candidate among the 
two viable candidates coincides with fully rational strategic voting, whereas under runoff elections 
this behaviour (sincere voting within a restricted menu of 3 viable candidates) is not consistent with 
voters being fully rational strategic (for example, because there is no point in voting for a candidate 
who is sure to be part of the runoff); see Cox, Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the 
World's Electoral Systems. In Van der Straeten et al., ‘Strategic, Sincere and Heuristic Voting under 
Four Election Rules: An Experimental Study’, we explicitly test for the hypothesis of fully rational 
voters, and conclude that the behavioural rule described here (sincere voting within a restricted menu) 
outperforms the rational model in explaining the data. 
xxii This can be explained by the fact that at the first elections of each series, a large proportion of 
voters votes sincerely. If voters vote sincerely, the distribution of votes among candidates is almost 
uniform (see footnote XIII). 
xxiii  See Blais, ‘The debate over electoral systems’. 
xxiv  Morton  and Rietz study three candidate elections, where a majority of voters are equally split 
between two close majority-preferred candidates, and the remaining voters prefer a third candidate 
(Morton  and Rietz, Majority Requirements and Minority Representation’).  They show that the 
minority candidate is less likely to be elected under runoff than under plurality elections.  Indeed, in 
plurality elections, the majority voters may fail to successfully coordinate on one of the two majority 
candidates, whereas in runoff elections, since one of the two majority candidate is always part of the 
runoff (when there is no direct winner on the first round), the Condorcet loser cannot win. These 
divergent results are due, we believe, to the different preference distribution and candidate locations in 
the two experiments. Whereas Morton and Rietz’s study essentially features a coordination game 
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between the two groups of majority voters, ours describe a situation with a more fragmented 
electorate, where the Condorcet winner can be “squeezed” between two moderate candidates.  
xxv In our laboratory experiment, we detect a strong psychological effect. How is it expected to 
compare to what would happen in real world elections? In the experiment, monetary payoffs are used 
to induce preferences over the set of candidates. The nature of those monetary-induced preferences 
may be different from voters’ true political preferences, and people might be more tactical in our 
experimental setting than in real world elections. Furthermore, in our experiment, elections are 
repeated by series of fours, allowing subjects some time to adapt and coordinate. Lastly, we use 
students as subjects, who are likely to have stronger cognitive skills than non-student subjects, and 
therefore may engage in more strategic thinking. We therefore believe that, compared to real 
elections, our experimental results probably provide an upper bound for the size of the psychological 
effect.  
